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1　　　　　　Ignorance－Christian　and　Buddhist：
Reinterpreting　Anselm’s　Proslogion　IV　in　Light
　　　　　　　　of　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　Zen　Thought＊
Tokiyuki　Nobuhara
1ntroduction
　　In　my　recent　essay”A，Buddhistic’Reinterpretation　of　Karl　Barth’s
Argument　for　the　Existence　of　God　in　Anselm：Fides　euaerens
In　tellectum”l　I　have　demonstrated　that　Anselm’s　Name　fbr　God，　aliguid
guo「「nihil’maius　cogitari、ρo∬it，　can　be　reinterpreted　Buddhistically　in
terms　of　Naga加na「s　notion　of”Emptiness”as　it　empties　itself　in　reference
to　Anselm’s　Proslogion　II　and　III．　The　argument　fbr　what　Barth　designates
as”The　General　Existence　of　God”2　developed　in、Proslogion　II，　which
Barth，　Hartshome，3　and　Malcolm　4　call　Anselm　I，　can　be　critiqued，　as
shown　by　Kant．5
　　The　argument　fbr”The　special［or　necessary］Existence　of　God”（AFQI，
132－161）or　Anselm　II　is，　nevertheless，　tenable　fbr　the　fbllowing　reason：On
the　one　hand，　Anselm’s　Deity　is”loyal”to　nihil，　or　Emptiness　emptying
itself，　inasmuch　as　nihil　can　be　conceived　as　greater（”maius”）than　aliquid，
or　Deity；however，　on　the　other　hand，　God　is　paradoxically　proved　to”be”
the　only　one　in　the　universe　who　can　call　fbrth　loyalty　in　us－and　this　in　the
capacity　of　the　one　who　has　experienced　loyalty　on　one’s　own．　Here　we
have　a　philosophical　explication　of　Jesus’words　urging　us　toward　perfection：
”Therefore　you　shall　be　perfect，　just　as　your　Father　in　heaven　is　perfect”（Mt．
5：48）．
As　is　clear丘om　the　above，1　have　applied　to　the　hermeneutics　of　Anselm’s
argument　the　threefbld　principle　essential　to　my　proposal　fbr　a　Buddhist－
Christian　theology　of豆oyalty：（1）God　is　loyal　to　Emptiness　or
Nothingness；（2）Emptiness　empties　itself；and（3）God　is　the　only　one　in
the　universe　who　can　evoke　loyalty　in　creatures（see”Buddhistic，”11－12）．6
Thus，　the　resulting　perspective　is　one丘om　which　we　see，　with　Anselm，　that
God　cannot　be　thought　as　not　existing．　This　is　the　way　in　which　it　can　be
2ascertained　and　verified　that”［T］he　whole　effort　of　Prosl．2－3had　been　to
prove　conclusively　that　God　cannot　be　conceived　as　not　existing．”（AFQI，
165）
　　1£however，　one　cannot　take　into　account　God°s　loyalty　to　nihil，　implied　in
the　expression”maius”（greater），　as　that　which　constitutes　the　inner
background　of　God’s　existence　ad　extra，　one　may　understand　God曾s
existence　as　simply　located　within　the　confines　of　the　world．　Herein　lies　the
reason　why　one　can　say　in　his　heart，”There　is　no　God，”while，　on　the　other
hand，”understanding，”albeit　only　rhetorically，　that　there　exists　something
than　which　nothing　greater　can　be　thought　because：
＿hOC・CU〃Z　audit　intelligゴt＿
．．．he　understandS　this　when　he　hears　it．．．7
　　What　we　are　encountering　here　is　the　problem　of　insipiens　or　of　the　Fool
which　Anselm　describes　in　these　terms：
（？uomodo　insiガens　dカcit　in　coi「de，　guod　cogitari　non　1ワotest．　　（1103，13）
How［血what　way］　the　fool　has　said　in　his　heart　something　that　cannot　be
conceived．（AFQI，161）
　　The　above　is　the　title　of　the　fburth　chapter　of　Proslogion；and，　as　such，　it
depicts　a　claim　or　a　statement　of　what　the　chapter　is　to　show．　Hence，　the
”9uo〃zodo’，　of　the　chapter　heading　is　to　be　translated”in　what　w復｝ノ’rather
than’ソzow”－the　latter　rendering　fitting　to　the’曾quo〃iodo”in　the　first　line
because　a　question　is　posed　there（see　IAA，70）．　It　is　important　to　note　that
the　confusion　of　two　cases（in　one　case　the　title　of　the　fburth　chapter
apPearing　and　in　the　other　case　a　question　being　Posed）of　the電tquo〃zodo電’
has　contributed　to　the　neglect　of　IV，　as　Schufreider　claims（IAA，71）．　We
have　to　be　attentive　to　the　difference　between　asking　how　the　Fool　thought
what　cannot　be　thought，　and　claiming　to　be　able　to　show　in　what　wのノthe
Fool　thought　what　camot　be　thought（IAA，70－71）．
　　Iconcur　with　Karl　Barth　when　he　says　that　the　statement，　reached　at　the
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end　of　Pros1．3，’the　fbol　has　said　in　his　heart，”There　is　no　God川一is　also　a
”statement　of　faith　which　as　such　requires　knowledge”（AFQI，161）．
’1Anselm，”says　Barth，”takes　fbr　the　su切ect　of　a　final　inquiry　not　how　the
fbol　comes　to　be　a　fbol－that　is　his　secret　and　God’s－but　rather　how　the
Fool　behaves　as　a　Fool，　what　constitutes　the　fblly　of　denying　the　Existence
of　God　and　to　what　extent　his　statement　is　really　nonsense　which　must　be
debarred　from　serious　theological　dabate”（ibid．）．　In　this　sense，　what　fbr
Anselm　constitutes　a　final　inquiry　in　Proslogion　IV　manifests　a　way　in
which　the　Fool’s　ignorance　can　take　place　in　his　mind　as　the　negation　of　the
completion　of1）roslogion　II　and　III　in　spite　of　the　fact　that　it　is　precisely　by
means　of　the　argument　of　II　and　III　that　Anselm　has　shown　that　God　tnlly
exists，　that　is，　so　exists　that　He　cannot　be　thought　not　to　exist．　This　is
because　it　involves　in　itself　clarification　of　the　problem　of　knowing　God’s
Existence　by　indicating　that　there　is　not　only　one　way（”non　uno　tantum
modo’，）in　which　something　is　thought，　thereby　articulating　the　locus
Iフhilosophicus　of　the　Fool，s　ignorance．
　　By　the　same　token，　it　is　crucial　for　the　Zennist　to　understand　the　core　of
ignorance　in　order　to　be　fUlly　awake　to　Enlightenment，　or　to　be血lly　open　to
infinite　openness．　I　think　a　clue　lies　in　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　statement　that
”［1］ndeed，　ignorance　is　the　negation　of　Enlightenment　and　not　the　reverse．”8
1n　what　fbllows　I　will　first　discuss　Anselm’s　understanding　of　the　FooL
Second，　I　will　deal　with　the　case　of　Suzuki’s　insight　into　the　core　of
ignorance．　Third，　I　will　explore　the　convergence　of　these　two，　resulting　in　a
reinterpretation　of　Anselm，s　1）roslogion　IV　in　light　of　Suzuki’s　Zen　thought．
1．Anselm，s　Understanding　of　the　Fool
The　first　line　of　IV　runs　as　follows：
レ「erZ〃Z　qUO〃ZOdO　diXit　in　COrde　qUOd　COgitare　nOn．ρ0伽’むaUt　qUO〃ZOdO
cogitare　non∫フotuゴ’guod　dixit　in　corde，　CU〃Z　ide〃Z　sit　dicei「e　i〃corde　et
cogitare2（I　l　O3，14f正）
But　how　did　he　come　to　say　in　his　heart　what　he　cannot　have　conceived　or
how　could　he　not　conceive　what　he　said　i　l　his　heart，　since　’to　say　il　one，s
heart’　and　’to　conceive’　are　one　and　the　same　thing？（AFQI，161）
4Here　is　what　Karl　Barth　calls　a”miracle　of　foolishness，v’（AFQI，163）Barth
explicates　as　fbllows．
1　．TyレO　nン「ays（～ブDiscussing　the、FoolishneSS　qヂ’乃εF∂01　and　the．4〃2わ’g〃’老ア
（”non　uno　tantum　modo”）of　the　Planes　ofGod－Assertion／Denial
　　In　reference　to　the　above　text　Karl　Barth　speaks　oftWo　ways　of　discussing
the　foolishness　of　the　Fool．　The　first　way　is　to　make　his　foolishness　as　such
the　starting－point．　Barth　writes：
He　says　in　his　heart　what　he　is　unable　to　conceive．　He　says，　namely，’God
does　not　exists’．　And　according　to　the　exposition　in　Pros1．3　that　is
something　he　cannot　conceive．　Not　at　all？But　he　nevenheless　says　it　in　his
heart．　Therefbre，　he　can　do　the　impossible．　For　obviously曾saying　in　his
heart’　and　’conceiving’　are　the　same．　Quesdons：How　does　he　manage　it？
How　can　he　reconcile　this　contradiction　within　himself？（AFQI，161－2）
　　Here　the　fbolishness　of　the　Fool　lies　in　improper　speech，　i．e．，　saying　what
he　is　unable　to　conceive．　However，　an　inverse　case　is　also　possible：that　is
the　way　of　making　the　fact　of　the　foolishness　of　the　Fool　the　staning－point，
thus　attending　to　the　fact　that　he　cannot　conceive　the　thing　that　he　says　in　his
heart－namely，”God　does　not　exist．et　Then，　what　is　the　reason　fbr　this　dual
miracle　of　foolishness？Anselm　replies：
12uid　si　vere，ゴ〃Z〃IO　quia　vere　et　cogゴ伽吻〃∫0伽∫∫ηCO鷹伽0η伽’加
CO1「de　g㍑∫αeogitare　non」ρ0’麗ゴt’η0η㍑〃O　tantu〃軍〃iodo　dicitz〃aliquid’η
corde　vθ1　cog　z°tatur．（I　l　O3，16f〔）
1£or　rather　because　he　has　actUally　conceived　it（for　he　said　it　i　l　his　heart）
and　has　not　said　it　in　his　heart（fbr　he　could　not　conceive　it）一一it　is　clear　that
’to　say　in　one’s　heart’or’to　conceive’is　not　an　unambiguous　proceeding．
（Barth，　AFQI，162）
But　if　he　really（㎞deed，　since　he　really）bOth　thought　because　he　said　in　his
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heart　and　did　not　say　in　his　heart　because　he　could　not血㎞k：there　is　not　only
one　sense　in　which　something　is　said　in　the　heart　or　thought．（Schu丘eider，
IAA，71）
However，　ifLっr　rather　because－rhe　really　did　conceive　of　it（since　he　said　it
血his　healt）and　yet　did　not　really　say　it　in　his　healt（since　he　was　unable　to
conceive　of　it），　then　there　must　be　more　than　one　way　fbr　something　to　be
said　in　one冒s　heart，　or　to　be　conceived．（Hick　and　McGil1，　MA，7）
The　Fool　conceived　it　because　he　said　it　in　his　heart，　on　the　one　hand；
however，　on　the　other，　he　did　not　conceive　it　l）ecause　he　did　not　say　it　in　his
heart．　Why　so？According　to　Anselm，　the　reason　lies　in　the　fact　that　the
assertion　and　the　denial　of　the　Existence　of　God　do　not　take　place　on　the
same　plane　ofunderstanding．　And　here，　in　Barth’s　view，　is　”the　fUndamental
solution　of　the　problem”（AFQI，163）．　Barth　explicates：
The　fbol　is　able　to　say　what　he　is　certainly　unable　to　conceive　in　so　far　as
when　he　says　it　he　is　standing　on　a　plane　where　he　can　assert　the　non－
existence　of　God．　And　he　is　unable　to　conceive　of　what　he　is　nevenheless
able　to　say　ill　so　far　as　he　is　standing　on　another　plane　where　it　would　be
㎞possible　fbr　him　to　assert　the　non－existence　of　God．　This　is　the　fbors
basic　folly　that　in　his　thinlCing　he　is　standing　on　a　plane　where山e　assertion
of　Gods　non－existence　is　certainly　possible　but　where　to　stand　on　that　plane
is　in　itself≒－fblly．（AFQI，163）
2．The．Possibiliリノand　the　ImpossibilゴζソofGod－1）enial！The　vox　significans
rem　and　the　res　significata
　　Then，　in　what　way　can　the　Fool　conceive　the　non－existence　of　God　while，
on　the　other　hand，　he　is　unable　to　conceive　it？Anselm　answers　this　question
by　indicating　that：
オ1’彪r　enim　cogt°tatUr・res・Ct〃n・vox・ea〃z　signiJ17cances　cogt嗣如耽α1’彪r・cu〃z・id
i　sum　quod　res　est　intelligi’tur．（1103，18f）
A　thing　is　conceived　in　one　way　when　it　is　the　word　describing　it　that　is
6conceived，　in　another　way　when　the　thing　itself　is　known．（AFQI，163）
　　That　is，　we　can　think　of　an　o切ect　by　thinking　of　the　word　describing　it
while　obeying　the　directions　we　receive　from　the　language　of　the　particular
word．　Thus，　we　consider　what　claims　to　be　the　thought　of　the　object
concerned，　and　admit　the　object　concerned　exists．　In　this　manner，　we
conceive，　on　the　intramental　plane，　the　voκs’gη哲cαη5　Dθ〃〃z，　the　word
describing　God．　Thus　far，　there　is　no　fblly　in　that　way　of　understanding　in
itself　This　reminds　us　ofwhat　in　Prosl．2Anselm　constnlcted　in　refbrence
to　the且rst　genera1飴㎜of　his　Proof鉛r　the　Existence　of　God　because　even
the　Fool　has　to　admit　at　least　the　intramental　existence　of　God　and　therefbre
to　that　extent　cannot　be　a　Foo1（cf　AFQI，164）．
　　However，　when　it　comes　to　dealing　with　a　real，　o切ective，　as　distinct　fbm
merely　conceptual，　existence　or　with　knowledge　of　real　existence　or
therefbre　with　Truth　itsel£our　intramental　conception　of　it　has　nothing　to　do
with　either　of　them　on　the　intramental　cum　o切ective　plane．　Accordingly，
Barth　is　right　when　he　states　that”［T］he　thinking　of　the　vox　signlficans　rem
in　itsel£in　abstraction　fセom　the　thought　of　something　that　really　exists，　or
set　over　against　it　as　something　diffbrent，　would　have　to　be　described　as
false”（AFQI，164）．
　　What　I　stated　above　holds　true　of　the　problem　of　God－denia1：the　Fool　can
deny　the　existence　of　God　intramentally，　but　it　has　nothing　to　do　with　the
real，　o切ective　existence　of　God．　Hence，　Anselm　writes：
刀Zo吻9祝θ1η04bρo彪st　cogt°tari　Deus　non　esse，　isto　vero　minime．（1103，20）
In　the　first　way，　then，　it　is　possible　to　think　of　God　as　not　existing　but
impossible　in　the　other．（AFQI，165）
　　On　the　intramental　plane　it　is　possible　for　the　insipiens　to　think　of　God　as
not　existing．　Anselm　does　not　deny　this　fact，　but　rather　admits　the　existence
of　an　intellectUal　capacity　and　the　inner　consistency　of　that　level　peculiar　to
him　where　he　can　only　think　falsely．”Falsely”by　which　we　can　mean，　as
Barth　claims：”．．．directing　one，s　thinking　abstractly　to　the　vox　sigmficans
rem［word　describing　the　thing］　without　knowing　the　id　ipsum　quod　res　est
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［that　which　the　thing　itself　is］－as　one　must　think　as　an　insipiens－then　it
really　is　possible　to　do　what　according　to　the　Proof　of　1）rosl．2－3　is
impossible”（AFQI，165）．　Falsely，　therefbre，　means　the　miracle　of
foolishness　by　virtUe　of　which　it　is　possible　to　think　of　God　as”not　existing，”
Here　God　is　the　issue　of”rhetoric　only．”And　there　lies　behind　this　merely
rhetorical　God－assertion／denial　what　Barth　insight血lly　designates　as　the
Fool’s　confession　of　”his　own　abandonment　of　God冒1（AFQI，168）－namely，
of　the　abandonment　into　which，　it　might　be　said，　the　Fool　is　abandoned
himself　by　God（c£Rom．1：28）．
　3　．Going　Z）硯アond　the　In　tra〃le刀’al　Plane’　しln　der　the　Co〃IIフulsion　qプthe
κ加wledge（～ズGod’Existenceプbr隔α’2
　　What，　then，　is　the　realm　which　lies　beyond　the　intramental　plane？It　is　the
realm　Anselm　depicts　by　reference　to　the　thinking　of　fides　quaerens
漉〃ectum，　which　starts　out　in　faith　from　the　knowledge　of　God　himself
whose　existence　it　wants　to　know　rationally．　Anselm　explicates：
八「ullzas　gui　pe　inteヲ〃igenL∫id　quod　1）eus　est，」potest　cogitare　quia　1）as　non
est，　licet・haec・verba・dたat　in　corde，伽伽例〃a・aut・cu〃z　aliqua　exranea
sigin　ij～｝atione．
（1103，20－104，2）
For　no　one　who　knows　God　hirnself　can　think，’GOd　does　not　existsL－even
although　he　may　say　these　words　in　his　heart，　whether　without　meaning　or
without　relevance．（AFQI，166）
　　Here　Anselm　shares　with　us　the　preSupposition　offides　guaerens
intellectum　which，　according　to　Barth，　cannot　be　abandoned　even　to　please
the　insipiens，　and　which，　on　the　contrary　rather，　just　because　of　the　insipiens，
has　to　be　insisted　upon　to　the　end（AFQI，166）．　The　presupPosition　on
which　the　thought　of　God’s　non－existence　is　impossible　is　nothing　else　than
”㎞owing　God　himself’－intelligere　id　quod　Deus　est．
　　It　is　precisely　at　this　juncture　that　Barth　shows　the　depth　of　his
hermeneutics　of　Anselm’　argument　for　the　existence　of　God．　He　states：
8From　the　whole　tenor　of　Anselm’s　thought　and　from　what　immediately
fbllows　itr、Das　enim　est　id　quo　maius　cogitari　non　potest［GOd　in　fact　is
the　one　than　whom　a　greater　cannot　be　conceived］－it　cannot　mean－
’㎞owing　God’s　Naturel　so　that　God’s　existence　would　follow　from　what　we
㎞ow　of　his　Nature．　It　is　certainly　tue　that　knowledge　of　God’s　Nature，　of
his　Omnipotence　and　Etemity，　of　his　infinite　Holiness　and　Mercy　is　also
included　in　inte〃igere　id　quod　Deus　est［㎞owing　or　understanding　that
which　God　is］．　But　the　fact　that　it　is　this　knowledge　does　not　compel　it　to　be
㎞owledge　of　God’s　Existence　too．　Even　if　every　conceivable　physical　and
moral　property　were　raised　to　the　nth　degree，　that　could　quite　well　be
nothing　more　than出e　sum　total　of　the　predicates　of　a　purely　conceptual
being．（AFQI，167）
　　What　is　important　to　notice　in　the　above　is　the　fact　that　Barth　thinks　it
impossible　to　deduce　God’s　existence　from　however　lofty　a　knowledge　of
God，s　Nature；and　when　Barth　says　this　he　is　basing　it　on　the　basis　of　the
Name　of　God，　id　quo　maius　congitari　non　potest，”the　one　than　whom　a
greater　cannot　be　conceived．”This　is　because　the　truth　of　the　matter　is　just
the　other　way　round－that　is，　God’s　NatUre　is　included　in　inte〃igere　id　quod
Deus　est，　knowing　or　understanding’”that　which　God　is”or，　it　might　be　said，
the　entire　life　of　the　Deity．　How　can　we　legitimately　deduce　God冒s　existence
as　a　predicate　from　God’s　NatUre－a　procedure　which　Kant　rightly　rebUked
although　reasoning　only　within　the　bounds　of　his　rationalistic　ignorance－
without　paying　due　attention　first　to　the　entire　life　of　God　involving　in　itself
God’s　Nature　and　God’s　Existence　as　they　are　inseparably　one？
Understanding　God　himself　is　to　truly　or　dynamically　know　this　inseparable
oneness　of　Nature　and　Existence　back　and　fbrth－that　is，　intra　se　et　extra
se－in　the　entire　life　ofthe　Deity．
　　Now，　what　will　happen　if　one　conjectures，　as　does　Barth，　that　what
Anselm　designates　as”id　quod　Z）eus　est”（which　I　rather　take　to　mean”the
entire　life　of　the　Deity，，）is　synonymous　with　what　he　himself　refers　to　as
”God　himself’（which　reminds　us　of　Barth，s　notion　of　die　inner－trinitarische
Go励θの？The　consequence　is　depicted　l）y　Barth　in　these　words：
The　fact　that　id　quod　Deus　est　is　synonymous　with　God　himself　makes　this
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amalogiCal，’speculative’　understanding　of　his　reality　into　tue　knowledge　of
his　NatUre　and　that　creates　the　fUlly　efficacious，　indeed　over－efflcacious
substitUte　for　the　missing（amd　necessarily　missing）experiential　knowledge
of　h㎞．　This　in　tUm　compels　knowledge　of　his　EXistence，　the㎞owledge
which　is　possible　and　becomes　real　so　necessarily　and　so　exclusively　as
against　all　ot　ler　knowledge，　includmg　all　denial｛and　doubち　only　in　so　far　as
it　is　knowledge　of　his　Existence．　God　himself　compels　this　knowledge．
（AFQI，167）
　　To　truly　understand　Nature　and　Existence　as　inseparably　one　in　the　entire
life　of　the　Deity　in　dynamic　relationships　to　God　himself　or　the　Godhead，
Barth，s　explication　of　Anselm’s　argument　is　neither　really　clear－cut　nor
proper　enough．　This　is　basically　because　he　takes　the　id　guod　Deus　est　as
”synonymous”with　God　himself．　From　the　viewpoint　of　a　Buddhist－
Christian　theology　of　loyalty　mentioned　at　the　outset，　it　appears　that　the
entire　life　of　the　Deity（which　is　what　id　guod　Deus　est　means　to　me）comes
to　be　as　such　only　in　dynamic　relationships　back　and　fbrth　with　God　himsel丑
五rst，　by　way　of　God，s　loyalty　to　God　himself（Ger．，　Gottheの；and　second，
by　way　of　God’s　evocation　of　our　creaturely　loyalty－and　this　as　the　one
who　supremely　embodies　the　Godhead，　i．e．，　God　himself”as”characterized．
（The”as”signifies丘om　my　point　of　view　what　Barth　intends　to　say　by　the
”synonymOUS．”）
　　If　this　much　is　clear，　then　it　is　not　difficult　to　perceive，　as　does　Barth，　why
the　above－mentioned　synonimity　of　the　id　guod　Deus　est（supposedly　the
Nature－side　of　the　Deity　as　a　whole）with　God　himself　tums　on　the　second
level　into　a　compulsion　of　knowing　God’s　existence．　On　the且rst　level，　God
as　the　Nature－intra　se　loyally　surrenders　himself　toward　God　himselfi　on　the
second　level，　however，　God　establishes　himself　as　the　Existence－ad　extra　in
such　a　way　as　to　call　fbrth　loyalty　in　us　creatures－and　this　whole　procedure
only　in　reference　to　God　himself，　the　Godhead．　Here　I　identify　the　Godhead
with　the　Buddhist　Emptiness　as　it　empties　itself　insofar　as　we　can　see　that
the　beyond－essence　of　the　Deity　as’！ρerichoresis”［circulation］is　in　itself
”relationality，”just　like　Buddhist　sunyata　is，　not　an　entity　or　a　person，　even　a
divine、ρersona　or、ρersonae．
　　If　that　be　the　case，　I　propose　to　interPret　the　rest　of　the　text　of　Proslogion
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17in　co切unction　with　D．　T．　Suzuki’s　explication　of”Enlightenment　and
Ignorance．”
皿．1）。T．　Suzuki　on，”Enlightenment　and　lgnorance”
　　What　is　needed　here　is　to　show，　as　much　as　possible，　the　core　of　Suzuki電s
grasp　of　ignorance　against　the　background　of　Buddhist　Enlightenment　in
order　fbr　me　to　apply　it　to　the　study　of　Anselm曾s　argument　fbr　the　existence
of　God　vis－a－vis　the　Fool’s　saying，”God　does　not　exist．’l　In　doing　this　I　will
not　dwell　upon　Suzuki’s　entire　reflection　on”Enlightenment　and　Ignorance．”
From　this　limited　perspective，　it　would　be　of　great　importance　to　mention
that　there　is　a　parallelism　betWeen　what　we　referred　to　as　tWo　ways　or　planes
of㎞owing　God　in　Anselm，　that　is，　a　merely　rhetorical　one　constituting　the
Fool’s　fblly　and　the　inte〃igere　id　guo　Deus　est（understanding　that　which
God　is）and　a　correlative　case　in　Buddhism　which　Suzuki　explicates　in　the
fbllowing　Passage：
Ignorance，　which　is　the　antithesis　of　Enlightenment，　therefore　acquires　a
much　deeper　sense　here　than　that　which　has　hitherto　been　ascribed　to　it．
Ignorance　is　not　merely　not　knowing　or　not　being　acquainted　with　a　theory，
system　or　law；it　is　not　directly　grasping　the　ultimate　facts　of　life　’as
expressive　of　the　will．　ln　lgnorance　knowing　is　separated　from　acting，　and
the　knower　from　that　which　is　to　be　known；in　Ignorance　the　world　is
asserted　as　distinct　from　the　self；that　is，　there　are　always　two　elements
standing　in　opposition．　This　is，　however，　the　fUndamental　condition　of
cognition，　which　means　that　as　soon　as　cognition　takes　place　there　is
Ignorance　clinging　to　its　very　act．　When　we　thir此we㎞ow　something，
there　is　something　we　do　not　know．（EZB，128）
　　As　is　clear丘om　the　above，　the　very　dichotomy　between　knowing　and　not
㎞owing，　the　one　to　which　we　cling　to，　is　that　which　constitutes　Ignorance；
and　it　is　in　parallel　with　Anselm，s　Fool曾s　saying，”God　does　not　existsノ’
despite　his　intramental　knowledge　of　God．　However，　one　has　to　go　beyond
this　dichotomy　in　order　to　arrive　at　Enlightenment．　It　is　precisely　at　this
moment　that　Suzuki　begins　to　speak　of”the　will．旧，The　Buddha’s　insight
penetrated　the　depths　of　his　being　as　the　will，　and　he　knew　what　this　was，
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yathabhutam，　or　in　its　tathabhava（thatness　or　suchness），　he　rose　above
himself　as　a　Buddha　supreme　and　peerless”（EZB，128）．　When　the　Buddha
rose　above　himself，　he　arose　by　his　utmost　will－power（see　EZB，125，127）．
But　his　utmost　will　power　for　what？Suzuki　answers：
Enlightenment，　therefore，　must　involve出e　will　as　well　as止e㎞ellect．　It　is
｛mact　of　h血1ition　bom　of　the　will．　The　will　w…mts　to　know　itSelf　as　it　is　in
itsel£アathabhutam　da∬ana，丘ee　ffom　all　its　cognitive　conditions．　The
Buddha　attained　this　end　when　a　new　hlsight　came　upon　him　at　the　end　of
his　ever－ch℃ulatory　reasoning倉om　decay　and　death　to　Ignorance　and丘om
Ignorance　to　decay　and　death，　through　the　twelve　links　of　the　Paticca－
samuppada．（EZB，126）
　　Although　scholars　are　tempted　to　ignore　the　significance　of　the　will　as　the
essentially　determining　factor　in　the　solution　of　the　ultimate　problem，　the
Buddha　basically　wants　an　illumined　will　and　not　the　negation　of　it－in
order　to　see　and　accept　itself　as　it　actually　is　beyond　the　epistemological
dualism　of㎞ower　and㎞own（EZB，127，158，131－132，129）．　What　does
this　mean　in　actuality？It　means：’冒After　this　present　life　there　will　be　no
beyond！”（EZB，134，141）．　That　is，　the　scale　terminates　in　the　”yathabhutam”
acceptance　of　the　world（EZB，140）．　By　this，　however，　we　do　not
necessarily　have　to　mean　the　denial　of　our　aspiration　fbr　salvation　after
death，　but　can　agree　with　the　Japanese　Zen　master　Ryokan　who　finally　sang
while　lying　in　bed　with　a　serious　illness：
waga　rpchi　o
tasuke　tarnae　to
tarK）mu　mi　wa
moto　m　chikai　m
sugata　narikeri
while　bese㏄hing　thee
f（）r　mercy　after　my　death
lo　I　find　myself
already　embodying
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the　Original　Vow　now！9
　　It　fbllows丘om　what　I　have　said　that　we　now　have　arrived　at　a　totally　new
vision　of”enlightenment　and　ignorance．”Suzuki　elucidates：
We　are　apt　to　think　that　when　Ignorance　is　driven　out　and　the　ego　loses　its
hold　on　us，　we　have　nothing　to　lean　against　and　are　left　to　the　fate　of　a　dead
leaf　blown　away　hither　and　thither　as　the　whld　listeth．　But　this　is　not　so；fbr
Enlightenment　is　not　a　negative　idea　meaning　simply　the　absence　of
Ignorance．　indeed，　Ignorance　is　the　negation　of　Enlightenment　and　not山e
reverse．（EZB，139）
皿。Concluding　Remarks：Toward　a　Convergence　of　the　Two
Refiections　on　lgnorance
　　With　the　realization　of　Enlightenment　the　whole　affair　of　life　changes　its
aspect，　and　the　order　instituted　by　Ignorance　is　reversed　from　top　to　bottom．
As　Suzuki　emphasizes，　what　was　negative　is　now　positive，　and　what　was
positive　now　negative．”Since　Buddhism　asserts　Enlightenment　to　be　the
ultimate　fact　of　Buddhist　life，　there　is　nothing　negativistic，　nothing
pessimistic［about　it］”（EZB，139）．
　　This　state　of　affairs，　in　my　view，　is　correlatively　and　interculturally
reminiscent　of　Anselm，s　knowledge　of　God’s　existence，　one　which　he　says
God　himself　compels．　Let　us　now　tum　accordingly　to　the　consideration　of　a
convergence　of　our　two　reflections　by　Anselm　and　Suzuki　on　Ignorance－
Christian　and　Buddhist．
　　A　clue　to　the　knowledge　of　God’s　existence　lies　in　understanding　that　the
Foolls　Ignorance　is　a　merely　intramental　or　rhetorical　negation　of　the
illumination　of　God’s　Existence　which　inheres　in　that　which　God　is，　and　not
the　reverse：By　that　I　mean　that　lgnorance　is　the　effect　of　his　negation　of　the
Divine　illumination；and　the　effect　vanishes　like　frost　in　the　sun　if　the　cause
evaporates．　As　such，　the　Foo1’s　Ignorance　is，　to　borrow　Barth’s　phraseology，
”confessing　his　own　abandonment　of　God．．But　in　no　circumstances　will　he
deny　God　himself’（AFQI，168）．
　　A負er　saying　so，　however，　we　hasten　to　add，　as　does　Barth：”What　the
insipiens　can　prove　is　this　and　only　this，　that　he　does　not㎞ow　him　whose
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Existence　he　denies．　And　it　is　not　his　denial，　but　his　not　knowing，　that
constitutes　his　fblly’1（AFQI，168）．　For　Anselm　writes　in　the　second　to　the
last　paragraphs　in　IV：
Dens　eni〃1　est∫とノ9〃o〃laias　cρ91°taη゜non」potest．　（iμod　guiわεηθinte〃’g鉱
吻ue・in彪〃’9ゴ’∫4加〃〃1・sic・e，∬e，伽ec・COgt書tatione　queat　non　esse．｛2ui　ergO
intelligz’t　sic　esse　Deum，　nequit　eum　non　e∬e　cogt’tare．（1104，2fD
For　God　is’that　beyond　which　nothing　greater　can　be　conceived．’Whoever
tmly　knows　that　knows　that　it　existS　in　such　a　way　that　even　in　thought　it
cannot　but　exist．　And　so　whoever　knows山at血s　is山e　mamer　of　Godls
existence　cannot　conceive　him　as　not　existh19．（AFQI，168）
　　Finally，　to　know　God　himself　is　to　understand　that　God　is　he　who，
revealing　himself　as　Creator，　is　called　guo〃zaius　cogitarゴneguit，　that　beyond
which　nothing　greater　can　be　conceived．　And　Barth　contends　that　God　is　he
who　immediately　con丘onts　us　with　his　Name　as　the　one　who　forbids　us　to
conceive　a　greater　than　him．　In　this　connection，　Anselm，s　expression”bene
in　telligere”［truly　knowing］，according　to　Barth，　is　not　to　be　immediately
equated　a　priori　withゴntelligere　id　i　sum　quod　res　est［㎞owing　that　which
the　thing　itself　is］．”But　in　the　sense　of　our　passage　bene　intelligere　is　the
fUlfillment，　the　development，　the　manner　of　this　real　knowledge，　which　by
its　relation　to　the　o切ect　establishes　itself　as　tme”（AFQI，169）．
　　By　saying”as　true”Barth　points　to　the　culmination　at　the　level　of
”existens”of　the　esse－ens－existens　development　ad　extra　of　God電s　mode　of
being［Ger．，　Seinsweゴse　Gottes］．　At　this　juncture　it　might　be　added　that
authentic　understanding　helps　reality［or　that　which　God　is］to　its　tnlth［or
God’s　Existence］．　But　by　virtue　of　what？Barth　rightly　replies：
It［bene　intelligere］　consistS　concretely　in　the　fact　that　the　embargo　contained
in　the　Name　of　God　is　heard，　recogniZed　and　obeyed　and　that　therefore　in　his
thinking　man　allows　God　to　be　God．＿Bene　intelligere　means：finally　to
realiZe　that　it　is　not　possible　to　think　beyond　Go（L　not　possible　to　think　as　a
spectator　of　oneself　or　of　God，　that　all　thinking　about　God　has　to　begin　with
thinking　to　God．　That　is　what　the　fool　and　also　his　advocate　Gaunilo　have
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not　yet　realized．　Those　who　have　realized　it，　by　so　doing，　stand　under
compulsion　of　knowledge　of　God’s　Existence．　And　immediately　and
p血larily　of　that　existence　of　God　which　belongs　only　to　him　amongst　all
that　exists，　his　sic　esse，　the　existence　which　cannot　be　annulled　even　in　mere
thought．（AFQI，169）
　　Here　1　only　would　like　to　add　that　the　compulsion　of　the　knowledge　of
God’s　Existence　is　due　to　the　fact　that　inasmuch　as　God　is　the　one　than
whom”Nothing　greater”［nihil　maius］can　be　conceived，　God　is　loyal　to
Nothingness　or　Emptiness　emptying　itself－which　we　Christians　can　find　in
the　intra－Trinitarian　Godhead　whom　Meister　Eckhart　calls　7＞ich　ts－thereby
paradoxically　evoking　our　loyalty　to　him　in　our　hearts　and　minds．”Therefore
you　shall　be　perfect，　just　as　your　Father　in　heaven　is　perfect”（Matt．5：48）．
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